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Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, the UN developed the so-called complex 
peace operations and became increasingly involved in peacebuilding, work-
ing alongside with other intergovernmental, governmental and nongovern-
metnal organizations. Complex peace operations (or complex peacekeeping 
as known in the Brahimi Report), includes the traditional peacekeeping tasks 
of interposition and observation, the new functions of elections monitoring, 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), protecting humani-
tarian relief workers, and transitional administration (Bellamy, Williams and 
Griffin 2004)2. Due to the great variety and interdependence of actors in-
volved in this kind of mission (military, agencies, NGO’s, etc.), the complex 
peacekeeping offers an opportunity to access how far Organization Theory is 
able to shed light on the interorganizational coordination in such operations3.
The concept of peacebuilding was discussed by Boutros-Ghali in the 
1992 Agenda for Peace, and was further debated in the 2000 Report of the 
Panel on UN Peace Operations (most known as the Brahimi Report). The 
Brahimi Report linked the functions of peacebuilding and peace enforcement 
to the definition of complex peacekeeping. In this sense, the Brahimi Report 
defines peacebuilding as: “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to 
reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building on those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (Brahimi 
2000, 3). On the other hand, Roland Paris suggests a more comprehensive ac-
1  Professor at the Doctoral Program of Military Science at Escola de Comando e Estado Maior 
do Exército (ECEME). Email: jmdallacosta@hotmail.com
2  See also Paris 2004.
3  See Herrhausen 2007 and Lipson 2003, 2005, 2007.
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ademic definition based in the premises laid in the Brahimi Report but more 
useful to analyse and understand complex peacekeeping: “actions undertaken 
at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of 
fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and 
civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to con-
duct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from civil war” (Paris 
2004, 38). Paris’ definition observes that peacebuilding is a post-conflict activ-
ity, and most importantly, it involves the participation of a range of different 
actors, therefore recognizing the need for coordination as part of the mission 
(Paris 1997). In this sense, as much as interorganizational coordination can 
be seen as a prerequisite to the operation’s success, also persistent coordina-
tion failures, especially through competition between the different actors in 
the field, can lead to the collapse of complex peace operations as a whole, and 
have impacts on future operations (Cooley and Ron 2002).  As mentioned in 
the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions: “(…) the multi-dimensional nature 
of such an enterprise [post-conflict peacebuilding], thus, demands effective 
coordination measures”. (Eidel et al. 2005)
The UN makes use of a notable number of coordination mechanisms 
for its peace operations. Those can comprise the use of Special Representa-
tives of the Secretary General (SRSG’s), personalities, definition of depart-
ments in the UN that stay responsible for the coordination measures (lead 
departments), deployment and support, the Strategic Framework initiative, 
Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), Humanitarian Operations Centres 
(HOCs), and Civ-Mil Operation Centres (CMOCs/CIMIC). Individual States 
also contribute to coordination with the development of a group of friends of 
the peace process, Contact Groups, etc. Nevertheless, the Peacebuilding Com-
mission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund also 
contribute to enhance cooperation in peacebulding (Jones 2002).
Interorganizational coordination is a serious pitfall especially in com-
plex peace operations that involve several actors with different organizational 
cultures. The UN has developed many mechanisms and techniques to deal 
with the coordination flaws in complex peacekeeping. The issues of interor-
ganizational cooperation are central to the Organizational Theory, and many 
branches of Organizational Theory can offer insights and shed light on those 
pitfalls and flaws. In this sense, the theory suggests that coordination can 
occur through transmission of common standards in organizational fields 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Studies based on transaction costs and relation-
al contracting present insights on the circumstances under which coordina-
tion using hierarchical structures and instruments are adopted and work well 
(Weber 2000). On the other hand, principal-agency theory argues that agen-
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cy control problems can discourage coordination in hierarchical structures 
(Hawkins et al. 2006). Coordination without hierarchy is also analysed by 
social network theory (Kadushin 2012). Most studies of peacebuilding in In-
ternational Relations tend to focus on the relationships between States and 
Intergovernmental Organizations. They tend to analyse such missions exclu-
sively as a principal-agent problem. They explain coordination problems as 
caused by a failure of delegation and accountability. This view lacks a more 
comprehensive understanding of the verticality of complex peacekeeping op-
erations and the great variety of actors involved. 
The recognized importance of actors others than intergovernmental 
organizations to the success of complex peace operations means that an ex-
clusively focus on hierarchical coordination is not able to grasp the complexity 
of these new kind of relationships. Interactions between various actors such 
as States, militaries, armed and civilian local actors, regional organizations, 
international organizations and nongovernemtal organizations must be tak-
en into account if one wants to understand how interorganizational coordina-
tion works in complex peacekeeping. Organization Theory approaches both 
formal and informal paths of interorganizational coordination, thus is more 
adequate to clarify how the coordination in complex peacekeeping occurs.
This article draws from previous research carried by Michael Lipson, 
Roland Paris, Thomas Weiss and others. We offer a brief case study of the 
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), explaining, with 
the help of Organization Theory, why the cooperation between military and 
NGO’s is efficient to deliver local ownership and increase legitimacy to the 
mission4. 
Organization Theory
Among the different approaches developed by Organization Theory, 
we will observe in this article the transaction cost economics and network 
theory. We understand that these two approaches better explain both formal 
and informal ways of interorganizational coordination. Other Organizational 
Theory approaches such as resource dependence, contingency theory, organi-
zational ecology and garbage can process can also be tested against our argu-
ment in order to achieve the best explanatory power (Fordisck 1999).
Transaction Cost Economics
4  This case study is largely based on interviews with members of the MINUSTAH, National 
Diplomats and NGOs representatives. 
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Central to the field of economic strategy, Transaction Cost Econom-
ics addresses basic questions of why companies exist and how they govern 
operations. In this sense, companies are created to structure and coordinate 
transactions in a controlled and predictable way.  This hierarchical coordi-
nation works more efficiently than the market. Therefore we can argue that 
organizational structures emerge as a consequence of economizing on the 
costs of arranging and implementing contracts governing exchange. Accord-
ing to Lipson, this logic, employed by International Relation theorists to ex-
plain international regimes and security arrangements (Hasenclever, Meyer 
and Rittberger 1997; Hart 1995), can also be used to understand coordination 
in peacekeeping. In his words:
This would suggest the hypothesis that the structure of coordination mech-
anisms should reflect the relative transaction cost efficiency of alternative 
means of coordinating interorganizational relations in peacekeeping. Ce-
teris paribus, where transaction costs of coordination are high, we should 
expect more hierarchical coordinating mechanisms, such as SRSGs with 
strong mandates and explicit authority. (Lipson 2007, 15)
Likewise, David Lake (1999) examines the relationship between joint 
production economies, governance costs, and costs of opportunism; while 
Katja Weber (2000) observes that transaction costs interact with threat levels 
to determine how much hierarchy will exist in a security arrangement. Those 
assumptions suit the case of cooperation among States understood as rational 
unitary actors. However they are not broad enough to capture the different va-
riety of actors (most of which cannot be included in the narrow category of ra-
tional actors, such as NGO’s and local actors) included in complex peacekeep-
ing. Those missions are better understood as open systems; therefore, due to 
the quantity and complexity of interdependent actors involved for the success 
of the mission, the importance of exchange of information and coordination 
among themselves and with the environment is fundamental. This suggests 
that transaction costs approaches, however useful to observe that the degree 
of hierarchy is in part a function of transaction costs, must be taken prudently.
Social Network Theory
More fruitful to our discussion on the interorganizational coordina-
tion in the MINUSTAH, is the informal coordination through networks of ac-
tors participating in the mission. Networks are more flexible than hierarchies. 
The basic premise of networks is that parties in the relationship are mutually 
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dependent on the resources controlled by each other, thus pooling resources 
can lead to mutual gains (Naim 2003). In this sense, the effectiveness of coor-
dination through networks have become salient with the economic, social and 
technological changes induced by innovation, higher levels of education, and 
the culture of cooperation and trust in sectorial industries (Alter and Hage 
1993). According to Alter and Hage (1993), this new governance mechanism 
is to increasingly substitute both markets and hierarchies. Because networks 
are much more flexible than hierarchies, it suits better in situations involving 
increasingly amount of information, need for rapid responses, reliance on 
trust, reciprocity and shared understandings, thus enhancing cooperation.
According to Lipson, in complex peacekeeping, much of the interde-
pendence and coordination occur bilaterally (when pair of nodes of a network 
are strongly coupled with each other) than multilaterally (when organization-
al nodes are tightly coupled and multiply linked). That is, most coordination 
occurs in situations when a NGO needs military escort, or when a civil affairs 
unit needs supply from local sources (Weiss 1998). In these cases, informal 
structures are more adequate (like the CIMIC/CMOCs), while more hierar-
chical, formal arrangements can be dangerous, or at least dysfunctional, es-
pecially in scenarios where principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of 
force are unstable or inoperative, and the locals perceive one or more actors 
involved in the mission as part of the problem.
This is not to argue that formal structures are not important for the 
interorganizational coordination in peacekeeping missions, but that in cases 
where actors are involved in ongoing, complementary activities and in cir-
cumstances that require operational integration, or under conditions of un-
certainty about how to obtain desired outcomes, informal networks are more 
likely to develop. These informal networks normally navigate around formal 
structures that are inefficient. They can develop when the formal structures 
present an obstacle, or even block the task to be accomplished for the suc-
cess of the mission. In these cases, informal networks complement formal 
arrangements compensating for their weaknesses. In extreme cases, all in-
terorganizational coordination may be carried exclusively through informal 
arrangements, rendering formal structures merely ceremonial (Alexander 
1995). This kind of decoupling between interorganizational coordination and 
formal structures is useful if makes the organizations coordinate better their 
activities through informal arrangements while keeping the hierarchical (for-
mal) structures intact in order to satisfy political pressures (Brunsson 1989).
Interorganizational Coordination in the MINUSTAH
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In February 2004, the Haitian president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, left 
the country after a series of armed conflicts that started in the city of Gonaives 
and threatened to spread into the capital city. In April 2004, the UN Security 
Council passed the resolution 1542, which established the fifth UN mission 
in Haiti, the MINUSTAH, to take over the Multinational Interim Force (MIF). 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti is the last of a series of UN 
missions in Haiti since 1993. The complexity of those interventions increased 
from peacekeeping to include State and nation building (Aguillar 2002). Ac-
cording to its mandate, the MINUSTAH is responsible for the establishment 
of a secure and stable environment; assist and support the political process; 
and monitor and report on the human rights situation (UN 2004). In this 
sense, the MINUSTAH can be included in the definition of complex peace-
keeping presented above due to its tasks that range from restructure the Hai-
tian National Police (HNP), run a DDR process (together with the United 
Nations Development Programme), foster political dialogue among political 
actors and assist the government to organize elections, monitor and report 
human rights violation working in close cooperation with the office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and deliver basic humanitarian 
needs to the local population. Thus, the range of actors and the tasks involved 
in this Mission requires well functioning interorganizational cooperation. 
This complex peacekeeping mission takes place in a very specific environ-
ment where local elites are used to foreign interventions and take profit of it.
The United Nations’ organization chart in Haiti resembles pretty 
much as a ordinary peacekeeping chart: with the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG) as head of the mission, the Principal Deputy, 
the elections section, the administration section, the Deputy Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident 
Coordinator and Resident Representative for UNDP; the military commander 
and the police commissioner (Marcondes 2008). While the chart is very clear, 
the situation on the ground determines the pace, and how the coordination 
among all agencies, local actors, and other stakeholders really develop. The 
one size fits all approach does not work in practise and the peacekeeping op-
eration (PKO) tend to interpret the mandate creatively according to the local 
specificities, finding the best path to produce bureaucratic problem-solving 
actions and concrete results for the success of the mission (Rocha 2009). 
In an effort to understand the specificities of the local Haitian elites, 
Antônio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha identifies there are three fundamental prin-
ciples that organize the Haitian society: short-termism, marronage and authori-
tarianism. These three principles combined influence economic, political and 
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social processes in Haiti. The first refers to the need that results of public 
policies must be seen immediately, because life is short (life expectancy of 52 
years old) and the future is uncertain. The second principle refers to the great 
informality and ambiguity in social interactions; it also refers to the fact that 
Haitians do not trust each another and hardly make commitments outside 
their family circles. The third principle refers to the fact that René Préval 
was the first and until now the only elected president in the History of Haiti 
to transfer the power peacefully to another elected president, Jean Bertrand 
Aristide, in 2001; it also refers to the fact that the political game in Haiti has 
no clear rules and political parties are created and dissolved according to the 
leaders’ short-term interests and political circumstances. This recalls the idea 
of predatory republicanism advanced by Robert Fatton (2002), to explain that 
Haitians see the access to State institutions, through regulatory privileges that 
favour families and economic groups, as the primary, or the only mean of 
acquiring wealth and power.
In this environment of short-termism, where everything is perceived 
as precarious and transitory, the actors strive for survival generating a cycle 
of fear among political groups. These groups use gangs in order to try to pre-
serve their political influence. The spiral of violence avoids any kind of agree-
ment among political groups and, due to its past record, international inter-
vention is seen as only a topic, transitory and superficial solution. In societies, 
like Haiti, where violence is seen as legitimate to solve conflicts and settle dis-
putes, this dynamic is perpetuated, exchanging periods of tyranny and of mob 
rule. Local actors have experience in dealing with foreign interventions, and 
see them as a possibility to take personal advantage. This also follows a circu-
lar logic: political crises are created and solved to keep financial inflows for the 
advantage of some actors, while the issues are kept unsettled. According to 
Antônio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha: “As the local elite understand the timing of 
missions and the persons in charge of the operations, as well as their profes-
sional career interests, they manipulate time, make agreements, foster social 
unrest, depending on the issues on the agenda” (2009, 17). Peacekeeping 
missions are also scapegoats for local elites that justify the government’s in-
efficacy and gain support among the population, normally telling the people 
that the country remains under foreign occupation. The degree of legitimacy 
associated with the local government also reflects the tolerance with the PKO. 
In the absence of legitimate authorities, spoilers feed the spiral of violence 
and avoid any possible agreement. 
The MINUSTAH operates in this complex environment, which in-
cludes also the participation of NGO’s, companies that provide different kinds 
of services, including security, flows of goods, persons and information, and 
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under strong media surveillance. Local elites charge donors and the PKO as 
responsible to address not only the security stabilization but also if not all, 
most social needs. The PKO is charged and pressured by the local elite, to 
build basic infrastructure, develop economic public policies, and create jobs, 
all designed to favour particular sectors of the economy or specific groups. 
The Haitian elite is experienced and skilful to affirm at the same time State 
sovereignty and its fragility, depending on the interest at the moment. In this 
sense they are able to explore the interorganizational flaws in the UN agen-
cies to set the timing at their favour, according to the case, creating changes 
to justify investments but controlling the final destination of the money at 
their own favour. In the radio, in créole (the local language), congressmen and 
members of the Cabinet blame the international community for the actual 
situation, trying to gain leverage among population and maintaining an am-
biguous and risky game. This groom image of the MINUSTAH gains force 
among the population, as it is asked to repress manifestations and control of 
social order. After more than ten years of MINUSTAH, the donors and inter-
national organizations still see the situation as volatile, while new urgencies 
that emerge around the globe demand resources and energy. The local popu-
lation sees the presence of foreign military troops as too long (Rocha 2009).  
For this reason, taking into account traditional political practices and 
understanding how the local society works are fundamental factors for en-
hancing legitimacy and increasing the chances of success of the mission. The 
recent experience of cooperation between different actors in the MINUSTAH 
shows that informal relations are the most effective way to deliver local own-
ership in an environment populated by a skilful elite, already used to take 
advantages from international interventions and the social need to see con-
crete outcomes of the mission in the short-term. Local ownership entails 
more than just organizing local elections, it represents that the key to the 
success of complex peacekeeping remains with domestic actors. However the 
Haitian case, local ownership beyond elections exposes tensions between in-
ternational norms and domestic realities. The necessity of the Haitians to see 
the concrete results of the peacekeeping mission in their daily life represents 
a big challenge to its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the traditional local owners 
– the local political elite – are the most problematic. In this sense, one possi-
bility to bypass the problem of corrupt local elites is to strength civil society 
organizations. Domestic civil society can be seen as an alternate set of agents 
capable of carrying out projects of local ownership, while strengthening the 
public confidence in the peacekeeping mission (Donais 2008). According to 
Beatrice Pouligny (2005): “[civil society is] often seen to carry the best hopes 
for a genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic ex-
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ploiters, and warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-ridden, weak, or 
failed States”.
Some caution is needed also not to over-dimension the importance of 
NGO’s to peacebuilding. In some cases empowered and activist civil society 
organizations can be just like the political elites that engage in factionalized 
politics (Pendergast and Plumb 2002). Especially in the case of Haiti where 
donors are faced with weak government institutions, tend to go around the 
government and prioritize the work with NGO’s. Nevertheless, institution-
al building must be the fundamental objective (International Crisis Group 
2009).
However, after legitimacy crises between the departure of Aristide 
in 2004 and the inauguration of Préval in 2006, the MINUSTAH regained 
legitimacy especially due to the Préval’s election and the successful deliver 
of humanitarian needs coordinated effectively by MINUSTAH and NGO’s. 
This coordination is done using mostly informal arrangements, which an-
swer more rapidly and effectively the needs of the Haitians, taking into ac-
count the local specificities. While the formal long term institution building 
is carried by UN Agencies, the local delivery of basic social needs is more 
effective through local and international NGO’s. In this sense, the two biggest 
obstacles to the success in Haiti depend also on the interorganizational capac-
ity of the MINUSTAH to keep developing the “peacebuilding from below”5, 
especially carried using informal coordination among military and NGO’s; 
and continue to address the Haitian State’s capacity deficit through the formal 
means of the UN Agencies.           
CIMIC and the BRABAT
In regard to the interorganizational capacity of the MINUSTAH it is 
fundamental to observe the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) especially in 
the Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT). The Department for Peacekeeping Opera-
tions (DPKO) defines CIMIC as: “(…) a military staff function that contributes 
to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components of 
an integrated mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development 
actors in the mission area (…)” (DPKO 2010). Brazil has not only the military 
command of the Mission but is also the major troop contributor with 1,343 
5  “(...) peacebuilding from below seeks to combine the top-down local ownership produced by 
national-level elections with myriad forms of bottom-up local ownership, in which local-level 
actors, communities, and organizations become active participants and agents in the peace-
building process, rather than simply passive recipients of outside interventions.” (Donais 
2008, 16)
Organization Theory and complex peacekeeping operations: notes from the MINUSTAH
188 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.4, n.8, Jul./Dec. 2015 
boots on the ground6. The relations between the NGOs and Brazilian troops 
have been described as “very positive” by some NGOs which previously have 
been declared skeptical of cooperation with military7. 
Each Battalion has its own Civil Affairs Section (G9) which coordi-
nates the CIMIC. The 6-month rotation of the G9 is a flaw in the long term vi-
sion for Mission’s interorganizational coordination. In this sense, we observe 
that each contingent has its own objectives established by the G9 according 
to the local circumstances. These objectives are in general restricted to the 
6-month rotation period. Besides, the lack of qualified personnel working in 
the CIMIC points to a difficulty to its activity (Cerqueira 2014). One of the 
greatest doctrine challenges of the G9 is to present the troops with a clear cut 
differentiation between CIMIC and Civic-Social activities. Civic-social activi-
ties are those short-termed, temporary activities performed exclusively by the 
military with the objective to solve a urgent social need and win the hearts 
and minds of the local population8. This misconception leads to the error of 
the military ignoring or duplicating the civilian effort. Besides the intensive 
training in CIMIC previous to the deployment9, informal talks between the 
military and the civilian components involved in the CIMIC were fundamen-
tal to understand the difference between CIMIC and Civ-So Actions. It was 
also identified that the information included in the Area of Responsibility 
(AoR) were exclusively target to military and intelligence activities and did not 
include CIMIC. There was no single document that included CIMIC activi-
ties in the AoR in which the military could base their planning. To solve this 
problem, the Brazilian Army started a new Strategic Study of the Area. This 
document, aimed at mapping the CIMIC needs to foster coordination, was 
based in two other documents: the NATO’s CIMIC Field Handbook and the 
Doctrine Coordination Note of the Brazilian Army (N. 02/2012). Six major 
fields of cooperation based on the Mission’s Mandate were mapped according 
to the AoR: political, security, economic, social, infrastructure and informa-
6  Figures of May 2015. 
7  Interview with NGOs. Especially the Viva Rio has openly declared their positive cooperation 
with the brazilian military in Haiti.   
8  “A set of non-permanent activies, episodic or of programmed assistance and aid to commu-
nities that promote the civic and communitarian spirit of citizens, in the country or abroad that 
is carried out by armed forces military organizations in the most varied levels of command. It 
makes use of the human, materail and technical resources available to solve imediate and clear 
dangers. In addtion to its nature as an aid initiative, it is also inserted as a civilian matter and 
collaborates in psychological operations.” (Manual de Campanha EB20-MC-10.201, Brazilian 
Army)  
9  The pre-deployment training is carried at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training 
Centre (CCOPAB). 
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tion. The document also mapped the main NGOs, IO’s (and agencies) and 
single governments’ agencies acting in the AoR. In the final document it 
was also listed an analysis of the stakeholders; mechanisms, best practices 
and platforms for civil-military coordination in the MINUSTAH; and CIMIC 
funding possibilities.    
As the Mandate’s deadline gets closer (complete withdrawal planed 
for December 2016) the so-called transition/hand-over phase speeds up with 
the execution of projects and delivering local ownership to the Haitian pop-
ulation. Two of these projects called our attention because they express how 
the informal channels of cooperation ease problems of interorganizational 
coordination in Haiti. The project “Honra e Respeito em Bel Air” (Honour and 
Respect in Bel Air) is managed by the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio. This project is 
funded by the governments of Norway and Canada and aims to bring drink-
ing water and waste collection to the poorest parts of Haiti. The NGO used to 
often require a convoy or military support to carry its activities. According to 
the Viva Rio coordinators, the military support was decisive for the success of 
the project, especially in the beginning. Eduarda Hamann, Viva Rio`s former 
coordinator argued that “(…) there is a strong and permanent interaction with 
the brazilian battalion”. Viva Rio’s founder Rubem César Fernandes agrees 
with Eduarda Hamann and adds that the cooperation through informal chan-
nels and personal contacts with the military component was fundamental for 
the success of the project. Other project that called our attention was the part-
nership between the BRABAT and the Child’s Pastoral10; the project, mostly 
funded by the Brazilian government, consists in bringing basic medical care 
to the Haitian population and promotes a debate within the Haitian govern-
ment on how to improve the Health System. In this project, the BRABAT 
helped with the relocation of a IDP camp (Internally Displaced People), offer-
ing technical courses, educational talks, and housing. 
The practice of informal networking seems to foster mutual trust, 
enhance interorganizational coordination and speed up the delivery of local 
ownership to the Haitian population. The G9, realizing that these informal 
channels were useful, redirected the community demands to the responsible 
local subunits, thus creating a direct channel between the local population/
NGOs and the subunits’ commander, enhancing trust. The order of prior-
ity was delegated to the subunit and the G9 became a facilitator, coordina-
tor and advisor to the local subunits, creating a better flow of information 
and command and control management. The technical courses also became 
very decentralized, with the local subunits organizing together with the local 
10  Child’s Pastoral founder Dra. Zilda Arns Neumann died in Haiti during the 2010’s earth-
quake. 
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community. The consequences of the decentralization were the increasing 
amount of interactions and informal channels of communications between 
the subunits and the local population/NGOs with the subsequent enhance-
ment of trust of these actors in the subunit’s commander; the simplification 
of coordination and prioritization of activities; and the empowerment of the 
local community and the subunit, speeding up the pace of how the local pop-
ulation’s demands were addressed.        
Final Remarks
A great variety of organizations take part in peacekeeping and peace-
building Missions, including UN Agencies, NGO´s, militaries, local civil so-
ciety actors, State actors, etc. We can recognize that these organizations have 
different and sometimes conflicting views, organizational cultures, missions, 
etc. Nevertheless, they are dependent, to some extent, on each other to accom-
plish their individual missions. Therefore, interorganizational coordination is 
a key element for the success of peace operations.
The organizations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding Mis-
sions have sometimes distinctive understanding of concepts and norms. 
These conflicting standards include basic norms of sovereignty, democracy, 
human rights, local ownership, etc. Peace missions are stark dependent on 
conformity of the understanding of those norms for its legitimacy. Therefore, 
if the organizations involved in the Mission lack common understanding or 
conflict heavily on this normative standards, they will fail to guarantee the 
necessary support (legitimacy) and resources to successfully accomplish the 
Mission. In this institutional environment these organizations are evaluated 
in regard to their adherence to collective standards and norms, ability and 
efficiency to perform tasks, provide goods, and most of all deliver local own-
ership.
Based on interviews, primary and secondary literature, we argued in 
this article that cooperation in the MINUSTAH successfully occurs using in-
formal channels between military and NGO´s. The NGO´s have a flexible, in-
formal approach and are focused on short-term projects destined to strength-
en local ownership. On the other hand, UN Agencies’ lack of coordination 
and the few projects directed to create local ownership from below are caused 
by the inherent UN’s interorganizational complexity and an understandable 
focus on developing Haitian national institutions. 
Finally, it is argued that Organizational Theory offers consistent ap-
proaches to understand the complexity of interorganizational cooperation in 
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PKOs. The MINUSTAH presents an interesting case for informal coopera-
tion as means to deliver short-term results and increase local ownership. This 
does not mean that every peacebuilding mission will be the same. However, 
applying Organizational Theory helps to shed light on factors that may enable 
or inhibit optimal interorganizational coordination among UN Agencies, the 
Military and NGO´s in regard to the local specificities.
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ABSTRACT
How far Organization Theory can shed light on complex peacekeeping operations, 
observing the explanatory power and differences among more hierarchically-based 
approaches and network theory? It also makes the case for further research on why 
and how local elites, experienced with foreign intervention, hijack international 
organizations to advance their own interests.
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